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In two experiments, we assessed age-related suggestibility to additive and contradictory
misinformation (i.e., remembering of false details from an external source). After reading a
fictional story, participants answered questions containing misleading details that were either
additive (misleading details that supplemented an original event) or contradictory (errors that
changed original details). On a final test, suggestibility was greater for additive than contradictory
misinformation, and older adults endorsed fewer false contradictory details than younger adults.
To mitigate suggestibility in Experiment 2, participants were warned about potential errors,
instructed to detect errors, or instructed to detect errors after exposure to examples of additive and
contradictory details. Again, suggestibility to additive misinformation was greater than
contradictory, and older adults endorsed less contradictory misinformation. Only after detection
instructions with misinformation examples were younger adults able to reduce contradictory
misinformation effects and reduced these effects to the level of older adults. Additive
misinformation however, was immune to all warning and detection instructions. Thus, older adults
were less susceptible to contradictory misinformation errors, and younger adults could match this
misinformation rate when warning/detection instructions were strong.
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Memory researchers have long sought successful techniques to enhance overall memory
accuracy. These techniques generally target one of two domains through methods designed
to a) improve veridical memory for a past event or b) reduce memory errors that may
subsequently occur at retrieval. Techniques such as deep levels-of-processing and retrieval
practice are hallmark examples of techniques that have successfully enhanced veridical
memory (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Huff & Bodner, 2013; Hunt & Worthen, 2006; Roediger
& Karpicke, 2006). In contrast, giving participants warnings, penalties for guessing, and
tests requiring them to remember the source of their retrievals have all been fruitful in
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reducing memory errors (Chambers & Zaragoza, 2001; Huff, Meade, & Hutchison, 2011;
Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; Zaragoza, Lane, Ackil, & Chambers, 1997). The present article
focuses on the latter of these two approaches by utilizing a misinformation paradigm that
elicits high rates of two fundamentally different types of misinformation errors in older and
younger adults.

Author Manuscript

Misinformation paradigms generally follow a 3-step procedure. First, participants are
presented with an original event. Second, participants are exposed to specific misleading
details about the original event, and finally, memory for the original event is tested. The
misinformation effect refers to the finding that participants often report or endorse
misleading details more frequently at test than conditions in which misleading details are
absent (Loftus, Miller & Burns, 1978; see Davis & Loftus, 2007; Zaragoza, Belli, &
Payment, 2007, for reviews). The misinformation effect is robust: It occurs when misleading
details are embedded in narratives (Takarangi, Parker, & Garry, 2006), questions (Saunders
& Jess, 2010), and in more ecologically valid materials such as photographs (Schacter,
Koutstaal, Johnson, Gross, & Angell, 1997) and post-event interviews (Mueller-Johnson &
Ceci, 2004; Sutherland & Hayne, 2001). Findings from misinformation paradigms are thus
applicable to eyewitness events as exposure to false details using methods designed to mimic
real life sources have similarly resulted in memory distortion.
Misinformation Types

Author Manuscript

Despite the wealth of research conducted using the misinformation paradigm, less is known
about how different types of misleading details may affect the probability with which
misinformation is subsequently reported. That is, how misleading details relate to the
original event may affect the potency of the subsequent misinformation effect. For example,
research has shown that false details do not need to follow an originally studied event as in
the traditional misinformation paradigm, to produce errors. Specifically, when participants
are presented with initial details (e.g., paints were stored in a closet) which are then followed
by information to retract those details (e.g., the closet was empty), the presentation of those
initial details are often falsely reported as occurring despite their retraction (Ecker,
Lewandowsky, Swire, & Chang, 2011; Johnson & Seifert, 1994). Thus, false details can
continue to impair memory accuracy even when those details have been dismissed.

Author Manuscript

In addition to the timing of exposure to erroneous details, qualitative attributes of how those
details relate to specific details from an original event can also affect misinformation rates.
As an early example, Loftus (1979) presented participants with misleading details that either
blatantly contradicted details from an original event or contradicted peripheral, non-focal,
details of the event. On a final test, blatant contradictions were correctly rejected far more
frequently than non-focal contradictions as participants were more likely to detect and reject
more discernible contradictions relative to those that were more peripheral. Thus, the
qualitative features of suggested misleading details can impact their later endorsement.
It is important to note however, that not only contradictions produce a misinformation effect.
In some cases, misleading details may be additive in nature by introducing false information
that supplements an original event rather than directly contradicting any specific item
(Tousignant, Hall, & Loftus, 1986). Although not termed “additive,” Loftus (1975) reported
J Exp Psychol Appl. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2019 June 01.
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a study that includes such misinformation. Participants were initially presented a film of an
auto accident that occurred on a country road. Later they were exposed to false information
suggesting that a barn was presented in the film when no information regarding a building
was originally observed. After a week delay, participants were more likely to incorrectly
report that a barn occurred in the film than those who were not exposed to information about
the barn, demonstrating that additive details can similarly produce a misinformation effect.

Author Manuscript

More recently, Roediger, Meade, & Bergman (2001; see too, Meade & Roediger, 2002) have
shown strong additive misinformation effects using the social contagion of memory
paradigm. In this paradigm, participants studied a series of static household images
containing a variety of common objects. Following study, participants then completed a
collaborative recall test in which a social other (in reality, a confederate) introduces a set of
schematically plausible, but non-presented contagion items that do not contradict any
original items from the scenes (e.g., falsely suggesting a toothbrush was presented in the
bathroom). On final free recall and source-monitoring tests, participants were more likely to
report and misattribute contagion items as studied, again demonstrating suggestibility effects
of supplementary details.

Author Manuscript

A critical question is therefore whether the qualitative differences between additive and
contradictory misleading details also produce differences in subsequent misinformation
rates. Loftus (2005) theorized that suggestibility to misinformation was based on the
Discrepancy Detection principle, in which misinformation endorsement was related to
whether an individual could recollect discrepancies between the misinformation detail and
the original event. Based on this principle, one may expect that successful rejection of
misleading information would therefore be more likely for contradictory items as memory
for an original item would be available with which to contrast misleading details.
Contradictory misinformation may therefore instantiate a detect-and-reject memory process,
a strategy that has been fruitful in reducing memory errors in other paradigms where error
detection is successful (cf. Gallo, 2004; 2013). Additive misinformation however, does not
contrast any one specific detail and thus, may increase the probability of misinformation
errors. Alternatively, additive misinformation might instead produce lower error rates than
contradictory if supplementary details are seen as distinctive since these details do not
contradict any one specific detail from the original event. If so, additive details might be
better remembered, leading to greater discrepancy detection and rejection on a final test.

Author Manuscript

Despite the distinction between additive and contradictory misinformation and the potential
impact on susceptibility to misinformation, only a few studies have directly contrasted the
two types. In one demonstration, Frost (2000) compared additive and contradictory
misinformation on a crime depicted on a slide show and measured the effects following
either 10-min or 1-week retention intervals. Contradictory misinformation rates were found
to be lower than additive, but only following the shorter 10 min retention interval and not the
1-week delay in which both misinformation types were equivalent. Akin to a detect-andreject process, Frost reasoned that for contradictory items, participants must have noticed
discrepancies with the original event at some level and were therefore less likely to report
misinformation after a short delay when the contradiction was still available in memory.
Separately, Nemeth and Belli (2006) also compared additive and contradictory
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misinformation effects using a variant of the social contagion paradigm. Unlike Frost, their
experiment yielded no difference between additive and contradictory rates; however, overall
misinformation rates were at floor making it impossible to determine whether additive and
contradictory misinformation effects could have differed. Thus, it is unclear whether the
difference reported between additive and contradictory misinformation types are reliable and
can be found using other materials when overall misinformation rates are off floor.
In the present work, we sought to directly compare and evaluate additive and contradictory
misinformation type differences, including their respective potential for error detection.
Importantly, we also contrast their effects in younger and healthy older adults, a discussion
to which we now turn.
Aging and Suggestibility
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It is well documented that, relative to younger adults, older adults show episodic memory
deficits, especially on tasks that require self-initiated retrieval processes such as free recall
(Balota, Dolan & Duchek, 2000; Healey & Kahana, 2016; Wahlheim & Huff, 2015). Further,
older adults show an inhibitory deficit in attention (Hasher & Zacks, 1988), which often
accounts for deficits in encoding and retrieval processes in memory. In a misinformation
paradigm, episodic deficits in older adults may compromise the integrity of the memory for
the original event which is then compounded by inhibitory deficits which may diminish the
ability to dismiss falsely suggested details affecting suggestibility. Further, older adults are
more likely to misattribute misleading post-event information as occurring from the original
event (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; Henkel, Johnson, & De Leonardis, 1998). Yet, despite
these clear age-related differences in episodic memory, inhibitory control, and sourcemonitoring ability, misinformation studies evaluating age effects have been relatively mixed.
Studies have found misinformation effects to be greater in older adults (Cohen & Faulkner,
1989; Loftus, Levidow, & Duensing, 1992; Ross, Spencer, Blatz, & Restorick, 2008),
equivalent between age groups (Coxon & Valentine, 1997; Dodson & Kreuger, 2006;
Gabbert, Memon, Allan, & Wright, 2004), and greater in younger adults (Holliday et al.,
2011; Marche, Jordan, & Owre, 2002). In a recent meta-analysis, Wylie et al. (2014) showed
that despite the variability across individual studies, older adults generally show a greater
misinformation effect than younger adults with a medium weighted effect size.

Author Manuscript

What remains unclear however, is whether age-related misinformation differences are
moderated by additive versus contradictory misinformation types. In the Wylie et al. (2014)
meta-analysis, additive and contradictory misinformation types were not evaluated as a
moderator, though the overall analysis included studies that included both additive (Ross et
al., 2008) and contradictory (Roediger & Geraci, 2007) misinformation. Age differences and
their relative magnitude may depend upon the type of misinformation that participants are
exposed to. For instance, research has shown that older adults are less likely to update
inferences about story plots when exposed to new information that change that inference
(Hamm & Hasher, 1992), though it is unclear whether this updated information conflicts or
supplements the initial story. Therefore, understanding older adults’ susceptibility to these
different misinformation types and the underlying mechanisms behind that susceptibility
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could shed some light on the mixed literature as well as inform the ways in which older
adults’ suggestibility might be reduced.
To our knowledge, there is only one study that included both misinformation type and
participant age as variables in an experiment. Saunders and Jess (2010; Experiment 1)
presented younger and older adults with a short video that depicted a crime scene followed
by a series of post-event questions containing additive and contradictory misleading details.
On a final cued-recall test, older adults were found to be more suggestible to both types of
misinformation, consistent with the Wylie et al. (2014) meta-analysis. Additive
misinformation was proportionally greater than contradictory; however, the authors did not
statistically compare their effects nor the interaction with age, preventing any firm
conclusions regarding the effects of misinformation type and age.

Author Manuscript
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There is an important aspect of the Saunders and Jess (2010) study that may compromise the
inferences regarding additive vs contradictory information. Specifically, there were
differences in the specific items used to introduce the additive and contradictory
misinformation. For example, contradictory misinformation was presented by misleading
participants that the burglar’s bike had a blue basket attached (vs. black basket) and additive
misinformation would mislead participants that a motorcycle drove by, when originally,
there was no motorcycle at all. These misleading details were not counterbalanced, so
differences in misinformation rates may reflect differences in the potency of each of the
individual items rather than the way in which misleading information was introduced. For
instance, misinformation about a motorcycle may naturally be more potent than that of a
suggested color and not due to how the misinformation interacts with the original event.
Thus, it is critical to contrast the suggestibility of both items when they are presented in both
additive and contradictory contexts. Given this shortcoming, and the importance of
understanding age-related differences in different types of misinformation, we therefore
sought to delineate misinformation type suggestibility differences in older and younger
adults while counterbalancing misleading items in both additive and contradictory
misinformation contexts to control for potential item differences.

Experiment 1

Author Manuscript

In Experiment 1, younger and older adults studied a fictional story and then completed a
cued-recall test that contained both additive and contradictory misleading details.
Immediately following the cued-recall test, participants completed a final 3-alternativeforced-choice (3-AFC) test which was used to determine both the correct memory of story
plot details and the suggestibility effects on memory for the fictional story. Importantly, all
items were counterbalanced to occur in all misinformation conditions. We expected that
across age groups, contradictory misinformation would be falsely reported less frequently
than additive misinformation as a discrepancy between the original detail and the
misinformation is more likely under contradictory than additive conditions (cf. Frost, 2000;
Tousignant et al., 1986). The notion is that noticing a contradiction will draw attention to
this discrepancy which in turn will be encoded into memory as “misinformation”.
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Regarding age differences, we expected that overall, correct memory for the original story
would be greater for younger than older adults on both the misleading cued-recall test and
the final 3-AFC test, consistent with episodic memory deficits typically found in older
adults. For misinformation, we expected that across misinformation types, older adults
would report a greater number of suggested misleading details as having been studied in the
original story, consistent with the Wylie et al. (2014) meta-analysis. Importantly however,
we also expected that the age-related misinformation difference would depend on
misinformation type. Specifically, we predicted that for older (vs. younger) adults,
misinformation errors would be particularly great for additive items since successful
detection and subsequent rejection of these details is difficult given the absence of a clear
contradiction. Since contradictory misinformation makes discrepancies between the original
event and the misleading details more salient, we expected that the age differences would be
reduced.

Author Manuscript

Method
Participants—Thirty-two Washington University in St. Louis undergraduates (Mage =
19.63; Range = 18–22) and 29 community dwelling older adults (Mage = 71.73; Range =
65–87) were recruited for participation. Younger adults participated for course credit. Older
adults were compensated $15 for their participation. Younger adults reported fewer years of
formal education than older adults (13.07 vs. 16.89, respectively), t(53) = 7.01, SEM = .55, p
< .001, which was not surprising as younger adults were primarily enrolled in first- and
second-year course work. Education was not reported by one older and five younger adults.

Author Manuscript
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Materials—During the study phase, participants read a fictional story entitled The Art
Thief (modified from Marsh, 2004) which depicted a tourist in a fictional land engaging in a
conversation with an art thief at a local pub. The story contained characters, an active
dialogue, and a plot involving a thief’s plans to steal art work from a nearby museum. The
story was approximately 2000 words in length which was broken down into 201 lines for
study. Embedded within the story were 36 critical statements that would later be used to
present misinformation. These statements were taken from Berger, Hall, and Bahrick (1999)
which contained fictional statements with several plausible target details that could fit within
that statement. For example, the fictional statement “Bumbaru palace in Zambari is where
the Monarch Konkali lives” contains the name of the palace as a target detail which could
later be contrasted with a plausible misleading detail (i.e., Simfara) to produce a
misinformation item. Notably, all information in the story, such as the above example, was
entirely fictional to remove the influence of prior knowledge on participants’ performance
(older adults in particular; see Umanath & Marsh, 2014). The critical statements were then
split into three groups of 12 for the delivery of additive, contradictory, or no misinformation
(i.e., neutral) which are further discussed below. The critical statements occurred within the
story at a rate of approximately one every six lines and the ordering of these statements was
once randomized and counterbalanced into three separate versions such that across versions,
each statement would occur in the additive, contradictory, or neutral conditions (see
Appendix A for the full story and suggested misinformation items used in both additive and
contradictory conditions).
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A series of 36 cued-recall questions were then created to deliver misinformation to
participants. Of these questions, 24 were misleading, split evenly between additive and
contradictory misinformation types. The remaining 12 questions were neutral, presenting no
misinformation. Each of these questions inquired about a specific piece of information from
the story. Importantly for misinformation questions, misleading details were embedded
within the cued-recall questions (see Table 1). These details were always peripheral to the
information targeted by the question, meaning that the misleading detail was not focal and
had no impact on the correct target answer for the question. For example, the question “In
what city was the palace where the monarch from Konkali lives?” would serve as a neutral
question, providing no misleading information. However, for misleading questions, false
information about the palace name would also be provided (e.g., Simfara). The misleading
questions were therefore constructed to present a specific type of false detail about the
original story (additive, contradictory, or none). As shown in Table 1, additive
misinformation questions presented false details that were absent from the original story but
did not contradict any specific detail. Contradictory misinformation questions presented
false details that directly contrasted to a specific detail presented in the original story.
Neutral items did not present any false details about the original story. The 36 cued-recall
questions were presented in a newly randomized order for each participant.

Author Manuscript

A 48-item 3-AFC test was then used to evaluate memory for the original story based on the
presence of interfering misinformation (Table 1). It comprised of 12 items which tested for
additive misinformation, 12 for contradictory misinformation, 12 neutral items, and 12 story
comprehension items to gauge memory for correct plot details. For additive, contradictory,
and neutral items, a line was presented from the original story with a blank where the
misinformation could have been presented. Three response options were provided. Two of
the options were concrete responses that could potentially fit within the blank. For additive
items, one response was the suggested misinformation and the other was a foil item not
presented in the experiment. For contradictory items, one response was the correct detail that
was studied in the original story, but the other was the previously suggested misinformation
from the misleading question phase. For neutral items, since no detail was presented in
either the original story or the cued-recall questions, both items were new foils. In addition
to the two details, all item types included a “I don’t know/Neither” response option to be
used if neither of the responses were deemed correct or if the correct option was unknown.
Comprehension questions inquired about a specific plot detail from the story (e.g., The
protagonist was staying at a _______.) and with the answer options as follows: correct (e.g.,
a hostel), foil (e.g., a hotel), or “I don’t know/Neither.” Comprehension questions always
included a correct response and a plausible distractor.

Author Manuscript

Procedure—Participants were tested at individually partitioned computer stations using EPrime software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002) with all responses made on a
keyboard. Younger adults were tested in groups of up to 4. Older adults were always tested
individually. An experimenter was present during testing for all participants. Following
consent, all groups received written instructions that they would be presented with a fictional
story on the computer screen and that their memory for the story would be tested later.
Participants were further informed that the story would be presented line-by-line and that
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study was self-paced and required pressing the spacebar to advance to each subsequent line.
Participants took approximately 10–15 min to read/study the story. Immediately following
study, participants completed a paper and pencil arithmetic filler task for 3 minutes.
Following the filler task, participants completed the misleading question phase. Participants
were instructed that they would be presented with a series of cued-recall questions and that
they were to answer these questions with information from the studied story. Answers were
to be typed into the computer, and participants were to press the “Enter” key when ready to
submit their answer. The test was self-paced, and participants were not warned about the
misinformation embedded within the questions. Additionally, participants were told that if
they did not know the correct information they could enter the letters “IDK” for “I don’t
know”.

Author Manuscript

Immediately following the misleading question phase, participants completed the final 48item 3-AFC test. Participants were presented with written instructions indicating that they
would be presented with a line from the original story with a blank space and were to select
one of three response options to complete the line to reflect what was originally studied.
They were further informed that two of the response options would be concrete options and
a third option corresponding to “I don’t know/Neither” that could be used if they simply did
not know the answer to the question or if neither of the response options were correct. The
three response options were displayed on the computer screen under each question and were
each yoked to a specific key on the keyboard. Participants were to press the key that
corresponded to the correct response from the story. As in the misleading cued-recall test,
the final test was also self-paced. Participants were then debriefed following completion of
the final test. The experiment required approximately 45 min. to complete.

Author Manuscript

Results
For all results reported, a p < .05 significance level was used except as noted. Effect sizes for
significant comparisons were calculated using partial eta squared (ηp2) for analyses of
variance (ANOVAs) and using Cohen’s d for t-tests.

Author Manuscript

Cued-Recall Test: Misleading Question Phase—Table 2 reports mean proportions of
correct recall on the cued-recall test in the misleading question phase as a function of age
group. Note that these questions served as the potential vehicle for misinformation. Correct
cued recall was computed by taking the total number of correct responses divided by the
total number of questions. Responses of “I don’t know” were counted as incorrect. A lenient
scoring criterion was adopted such that misspellings of correct responses were counted as
correct. An independent-samples t-test revealed that younger adults recalled more correct
details than older adults (.41 vs. .30, respectively), t(59) = 2.80, SEM = .04, d = 0.73—
consistent with typical age-related episodic memory declines.
Final 3-AFC Test—Table 2 reports mean proportions of correctly selected alternatives for
plot comprehension, additive, contradictory, and neutral items, and the proportions of falsely
selected misinformation alternatives for additive and contradictory items for younger and
older adults. Correct alternative selection was computed differently for neutral, additive, and
contradictory items. For additive and neutral items, a response was counted as correct when
J Exp Psychol Appl. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2019 June 01.
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the “I don’t know/Neither” option was selected since neither option was presented in the
original story, whereas, for contradictory items, a response was counted as correct when the
item from the original story was selected. For misinformation responses, additive and
contradictory misinformation rates were computed as the proportion of questions in which
the misleading detail was selected. Note that neutral items were not included in this analysis
as falsely suggested details were not presented for these items.
Beginning with correctly selected alternatives for plot comprehension items, younger and
older adults selected correct details at a similar high rate (.93 vs. .90), t(59) = 1.51, SEM = .
02, p = .14, thus both age groups could retrieve basic plot details with high acuity.

Author Manuscript

Proportions of correctly selected alternatives for additive, contradictory, and neutral items
were then compared as a function of age group using a 3 (Item Type: Additive vs.
Contradictory vs. Neutral) × 2 (Age: Younger vs. Older) mixed ANOVA. A significant effect
of Item Type was found, F(2, 118) = 25.75, MSE = .05, ηp2 = .30, which indicated that the
that selection of the correct alternative was greatest for contradictory items (.51), followed
by neutral (.42) and additive items (.24)—a pattern likely due to contradictory test items
presenting the original studied item as an alternative, enhancing discrimination for the
correct response. The effect of Age was not significant, F < 1; however, a significant Item
Type × Age interaction was found, F(2, 118) = 3.52, MSE = .05, ηp2 = .05. Follow-up
comparisons revealed that the proportion of correctly selected alternatives between younger
and older adults did not differ on either neutral (.43 vs. .42), t < 1, or additive items (.26 vs. .
21), t < 1, but interestingly, for contradictory items, younger adults showed lower correct
selection than that of older adults (.44 vs. .59), t(59) = 2.82, SEM = .05, d = 0.73. Thus,
older adults were more likely to select the correct detail from memory when conflicting
alternatives were available at test.

Author Manuscript

Turning to the false selection of suggested misinformation details, a 2 (Item Type: Additive
vs. Contradictory) × 2 (Age: Younger vs. Older) mixed ANOVA was used to compare
misinformation effects between the two age groups. An effect of Item Type, F(1, 59) =
42.99, MSE = .03, ηp2 = .42, reflected greater selection of false additive than contradictory
alternatives (.54 vs. .34), but again, the Age effect was not significant, F < 1. A reliable Item
Type × Age interaction was found, F(1, 59) = 6.67, MSE = .03, ηp2 = .10, which revealed a
similar selection of false items between younger and older adults on additive items (.52 vs. .
57), t < 1, but for contradictory items, younger adults were more likely to select the false
suggested detail than older adults (.40 vs. .28), t(59) = 2.18, SEM = .04, d = 0.57. Thus,
older adults showed a memory accuracy benefit through a reduction in suggestibility to
contradictory misinformation.

Author Manuscript

Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 revealed important novel differences in the selection of correct
and misinformation alternatives based on the type of misinformation participants were
exposed to and their age group. Consistent with our prediction, correct response selection for
additive items was impaired relative to contradictory items as shown by a decrease in correct
alternative selection and a concomitant increase in the selection of additive misinformation.
We argue that the reduction in memory accuracy for the additive items is due to a greater
J Exp Psychol Appl. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2019 June 01.
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difficulty in detection and rejection of the misinformation alternative. We argue that this
pattern occurs due to the absence of conflicting information from the original event in which
no clear discrepancy is available to facilitate monitoring at test. For contradictory items, a
discrepancy was more likely, and thus, participants were less likely to select the
contradictory misinformation alternative.

Author Manuscript

One account for this pattern may be due to qualitative differences in how older adults
approach a misleading cued-recall test that contains a high degree of errors. Perhaps older
adults are more motivated to attend to potential errors and thus are more cautious about
incorporating erroneous details into memory when those details contradict details from the
original event. That is, older adults may be more vigilant regarding contradictory error
detection during the misleading question phase and subsequently are better able to reject the
misinformation answers on the final test. For additive misinformation, however, error
detection is likely more difficult and thus suggestibility to those errors is age invariant.
Consistent with this possibility, older adults have shown intact error detection capacities in a
variety of stimuli and circumstances from marking misspelled words (MacKay, Abrams, &
Pedroza, 1999), correcting their mistakes in identifying target digits on a screen (Rabbitt,
1979), and noticing errors in rhythm synchronization (Turgeon, Wing, & Taylor, 2010).
Older adults have been shown to be as good as (Umanath & Marsh, 2012) and sometimes
better than younger adults at detecting errors that contradict prior knowledge (Schwartz,
2002). Similarly, if older adults naturally direct themselves to be on guard for errors, they
may be more effective at spontaneously detecting them and mitigating their later
suggestibility.

Author Manuscript
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In contrast to our prediction however, older and younger adults showed equivalent
misinformation rates on additive items, but older adults were less likely to report falsely
suggested contradictory items on the final test than younger adults. This latter result, though
not entirely unheard of (e.g., Holliday et al., 2011; Marche, Jordan, & Owre, 2002), is rather
surprising given older adults show deficits in controlled retrieval processes (Craik, 1986) and
show impoverished source monitoring abilities (Hashtroudi, Johnson, & Chrosniak, 1989),
both of which would likely impair their ability to successfully detect and reject
misinformation. Further, this difference occurred even though memory for plot details in the
original event was equivalent between both age groups.

A possible reason for increased vigilance towards error detection may be due to increased
motivation due to age-related differences in personality. Older adults may have increased
motivation in the task due to age-related differences in conscientiousness—a personality
factor that involves increased carefulness and vigilance when completing daily tasks. Crosssectional evidence shows that older adults report greater conscientiousness than typical
university-aged younger adults (see Donnellan & Lucas, 2008 for a review) and this
personality difference may be related to cognition. As an example, there is evidence of a
relationship between conscientiousness and performance on an attentional task. Jackson and
Balota (2012) showed a negative relationship between conscientiousness factor on the NEOFFI (Costa & McCrae, 1992) and errors and subjective reports of mind-wandering for
younger and older adults on a sustained attention task. Older adults, who are more vigilant
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when making responses on the sustained attention task, may therefore be less likely to show
attentional lapses which include errors and off-task thoughts.

Author Manuscript

If older adults respond with greater vigilance during the cued-recall test due to exposure to
several errant items which, in turn, reduces contradictory misinformation on the final test, it
is possible that younger adults could as well, but require additional instruction to do so. As
an example, research in the discourse-processing literature has shown that when high school
and university students are given instructions to process important text information more
deeply, they are slower to read this information and show better memory for it at test (Jetton
& Alexander, 1997; McCrudden, Magliano, & Schraw, 2010). To the extent that when
participants are provided with instruction to deliberately process errors, memory for these
errors may be enhanced which may improve rejection on the final test. Therefore, in
Experiment 2, we evaluated the effects of three different types of warnings on additive and
contradictory misinformation rates in younger and older adults. The purpose of these
instructions was to contrast instructions with increasing emphasis towards error detection to
determine the point in which error detection is effective at reducing suggestibility to
misleading information, particularly in younger adults. We predicted that younger adults
would similarly be able to reduce contradictory misinformation to that of older adults, but
only under strong detection instructions that included examples of misinformation types.

Experiment 2

Author Manuscript

Given reduced contradictory misinformation rates found in older adults, Experiment 2
sought to evaluate whether warning instructions—which should enhance how participants
scrutinize their responses on the final test—may lead younger adults to respond similarly to
older adults. Previous research has shown that warning participants about misinformation
exposure can be effective in reducing misinformation rates both when warnings are
presented pre- and post-exposure to misinformation (Eakin, Schreiber, & Sergent-Marshall,
2003; Chambers & Zaragoza, 2001; see Blank & Launay, 2014, for a meta-analysis of postexposure warnings) and when the misleading details are both additive (Meade & Roediger,
2002) and contradictory (Wright, 1993), though these item types have not been compared
within the same experiment.

Author Manuscript

In Experiment 2, we examined the effects of different types of warnings on misinformation
in older and younger adults by manipulating the strength of warning using an error detection
instruction which required participants to specify those errors encountered in the misleading
question phase. Prior to the cued-recall test, participants were given either a general warning
about misleading errors (Warning group), given a general warning and asked to detect each
error encountered (Detection group), or provided with a general warning with examples of
both misinformation types and asked to detect these errors (Detection + Examples group).
We hypothesized that if older adults were naturally more vigilant towards detecting (and
subsequently rejecting) errors, additional instruction to detect errors would not procure
further reduction in contradictory misinformation on the final test. In contrast, if younger
adults are not as vigilant towards errors, instructions that emphasize error detection will be
necessary to produce a reduction in contradictory misinformation.
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Participants—Ninety-two Washington University in St. Louis undergraduates (Mage =
19.28; Range = 18–22) and 87 community-dwelling older adults (Mage = 71.21; Range =
65–86) were recruited for participation. Younger adults received course credit for
participation and older adults were compensated $15. Both age groups were randomly
assigned to the Warning, Detection, and Detection + Examples groups. The assignment of
participants in each group was relatively evenly distributed and is reported in Table 3.
Younger adults again reported fewer years of formal education than older adults (13.15 vs.
16.52), t(170) = 11.25, SEM = .30, p < .001. Within each of the younger and older adult
groups, there were no differences in age or education across the three instruction groups, ts <
1.63, ps > .11. Education was not reported by one older and seven younger adults.

Author Manuscript
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Materials and Procedure—Experiment 1 materials and procedure were used with the
following modifications. Prior to the misleading question phase, participants received an
additional set of condition-specific instructions that provided information about the
upcoming misinformation. The Warning group was informed that while answering the
questions they may encounter false information that was not originally presented in the story
but were to still try to answer the questions as accurately as possible. The Detection group
was informed that in addition to the possibility of encountering false information, they were
also to report any of errors that might be embedded in the cued recall questions. Specifically,
for each error detected on the cued-recall test, they were to enter an “e” for error rather than
answering the question. The Detection + Examples group was instructed to similarly report
all detected errors as the Detection group, but was additionally provided with concrete
examples of additive and contradictory misinformation errors that were unrelated to the
story to emphasize detection during this phase. Participants were instructed to be vigilant for
either error type as they were completing the test. During the cued-recall questions, both the
Detection and Detection + Examples groups were presented with a cue of “E = Error” on the
computer screen beneath each question as a reminder to report detected errors. The
condition-specific warning/detection instructions were not mentioned again following the
misleading question phase.
Results and Discussion

Author Manuscript

Cued-Recall Test: Misleading Question Phase—Mean proportions of correct recall
on the misleading cued-recall test are reported in Table 3 as a function of age and warning
instructions. Correct cued-recall was computed in an identical fashion to Experiment 1 with
the exception that items denoted as containing an error in the Detection and Detection +
Examples groups were omitted from computing the proportion correct. Thus, only those
items that were given a memory response or “I don’t know” were included in the
calculation. As in Experiment 1, an effect of Age was found, F(1, 173) = 14.80, MSE = .03,
ηp2 = which reflected greater correct recall for younger than older adults (.40 vs. .31).
Neither the effect of Warning Instructions nor the interaction were significant, Fs < 1.74, ps
> .18, demonstrating that instructing participants to report detected errors did not affect the
correct recall rate for either younger or older adults.
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Error Detection—We examined successful misinformation detection rates for the two
detection groups during the cued-recall test (see Table 3). A 3 (Item Type: Additive vs.
Contradictory vs. Neutral) × 2 (Detection Group: Detection vs. Detection + Examples) × 2
(Age: Younger vs. Older) mixed ANOVA yielded a significant main effects of Item Type,
F(2, 232) = 97.77, MSE = .02, ηp2 = .46, Detection Group, F(1, 116) = 21.05, MSE = .06,
ηp2 = .15, and a numeric trend of Age, F(1, 116) = 3.04, MSE = .06, p = .08, ηp2 = .03.
Critically, these effects were qualified by a significant three-way interaction, F(2, 232) =
3.73, MSE = .02, ηp2 = .03. Follow-up comparisons revealed that this interaction was due to
age differences in detection rates between the two detection groups. Specifically, younger
adults showed an increase in detection rates in the Detection + Examples group for both
additive (.47 vs. .18), t(59) = 5.21, SEM = .05, d = 1.36, and contradictory items (.44 vs. .
26), t(59) = 3.35, SEM = .05, d = 0.87, but not for neutral items (.11 vs. .08), t < 1. The
increase in correct detection rate for younger adults from the Detection to the Detection +
Examples groups demonstrates that younger adults could improve successful detection of
both misinformation types, but only with the strong warning presented in the Detection +
Examples instructions. Older adults however, were good at detecting errors in both the
Detection and Detection + Examples groups, ts < 1.80, ps > .08.
Final 3-AFC Test—Proportions of correctly selected alternatives for comprehension,
additive, contradictory, and neutral items as a function of age and warning group are
reported in Table 4. Starting with comprehension items, an effect of Age was found, F(1,
173) = 7.13, MSE = .01, ηp2 = .04, which reflected greater correct alternative selection of
plot details for younger than older adults (.91 vs. .88). The effect of Warning Group and the
interaction failed to reach significance, Fs < 1.38, ps > .25, showing that warning
instructions did not differentially affect memory rates for correct plot details.
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Turning to correctly selected alternatives for additive, contradictory, and neutral items, a 3
(Item Type: Additive vs. Contradictory vs. Neutral) × 3 (Warning Group: Warning vs.
Detection vs. Detection + Examples) × 2 (Age: Younger vs. Older) mixed ANOVA was
used. Proportions of correctly selected alternatives were computed as in Experiment 1. An
effect of Item Type was found, F(2, 346) = 87.60, MSE = .05, , ηp2 = .34, which reflected
greater correct alternative selection for contradictory items than either additive (.56 vs. .27),
t(178) = 12.46, SEM = .02, d = 1.32, or neutral items (.56 vs. .48), t(178) = 2.97, SEM = .03,
d = 0.30, and greater selection of correct alternatives for neutral than additive items (.48 vs. .
27), t(178) = 12.67, SEM = .02, d = 0.77. An effect of Warning Group was also found, F(2,
173) = 4.45, MSE = .10, ηp2 = .05. Follow-up comparisons revealed that correct alternative
selection was greater in the Detection + Examples group than both the Warning (.49 vs. .42),
t(117) = 2.30, SEM = .03, d = 0.43, and Detection groups (.49 vs. .40), t(118) = 2.78, SEM
= .03, d = 0.51. No difference was found between the Warning and Detection groups (.42
vs. .40), t < 1. Therefore, providing examples of errors during the misleading question phase
produced a memory benefit on the final test by increasing the selection of the correct
alternative that the detection instructions alone did not provide.
A significant effect of Age was also found, F(1, 173) = 7.12, MSE = .10, ηp2 = .04, in which
older adults showed greater correct alternative selection than younger adults. All interactions
including the three-way interaction failed to reach significance, all Fs < 1.26, ps > .28. Thus,
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in departure from Experiment 1, older adults showed greater correct alternative selection
across item types and not solely for contradictory items, which may be due to participants
receiving a warning across all instruction groups.
Proportions of falsely selected misinformation details were then compared using a 2 (Item
Type: Additive vs. Contradictory) × 2 (Age: Younger vs. Older) × 3 (Warning Group:
Warning vs. Detection vs. Detection + Examples) ANOVA (see Table 4). Significant effects
of Item Type, F(1, 173) = 146.78, MSE = .04, ηp2 = .46, and Age were found, F(1, 173) =
9.99, MSE = .04, ηp2 = .06, and the effect of Warning Group was trending, F(2, 173) = 2.34,
MSE = .04, p < .10, ηp2 = .06.
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Critically, these main effects were qualified by a three-way interaction that was right at the
significance level, F(2, 173) = 2.87, MSE = .04, p = .05, ηp2 = .06. Consistent with our
predictions, follow-up tests revealed that the Detection + Examples group was beneficial in
reducing misinformation selection, but only for younger adults and only for contradictory
items. Specifically, younger adults showed lower suggestibility to contradictory
misinformation in the Detection + Examples group than either the Warning (.26 vs. .40),
t(59) = 2.96, SEM = .05, d = 0.77, or Detection groups (.26 vs. .41), t(59) = 3.17, SEM = .
05, d = 0.83, with no difference between the Warning and Detection groups (.40 vs. .41). No
instruction differences were found for younger adults with additive misinformation, and no
effects for either misinformation type were found for older adults, ts < 1.01, ps > .31.
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In sum, warning instructions appear to show age-specific effects in reducing misinformation
suggestibility. When detection instructions provide specific examples of additive and
contradictory misinformation types, younger adults show a reduction in misinformation
selection, but only when suggested errors contradict details from the original story. This
pattern is consistent with our predictions that older adults are spontaneously more vigilant
towards detecting contradictory errors than younger adults and therefore show reduced
misinformation effects on a final test. Because of this general detection process, older adults
are unaffected by instructions that emphasize error detection and show no further reductions
in contradictory misinformation. Younger adults on the other hand, are less vigilant in
detecting contradictions, but can improve their detection of errors under strong detection
instructions. Note that their improvement in the detection of errors and subsequent reduction
in suggestibility to contradictory misinformation brings them to the level of older adults’
performance on these tasks.
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We further conducted a series of analyses comparing misinformation rates on the final test
conditionalized as a function of successful and unsuccessful detection on the misleading
cued-recall test. These results closely parallel the unconditionalized results above and
therefore we have relegated these results and their discussion to Appendix B.

General Discussion
The purpose of our study was to provide a direct comparison between additive and
contradictory misinformation types and their suggestibility in younger and older adults. In
two experiments, we demonstrated that suggested additive details that supplement an
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original event were falsely recognized at a greater rate than contradictory details that
conflicted with specific details in the original event. This pattern was found in both younger
and older adults, demonstrating that the effects of additive misinformation are costly across
age groups. We argue that differences in misinformation types reflect a detect-and-reject
process whereby discrepancies between contradictory details and those in the original event
increase the likelihood that misinformation is subsequently rejected at test (see Huff, Davis,
& Meade, 2013; Loftus, 2005; Tousignant et al., 1986, for discussion). The higher rate of
additive misinformation provides evidence against the possibility that these supplementary
details are more memorable, and in turn, better rejected at test. Thus, qualitative features of
how false details impact original event details can influence their later endorsement.
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Our comparison of additive and contradictory misinformation effects in younger and older
adults was designed to address important limitations reported in other experiments. First, our
study statistically compared the two types of misinformation and their magnitude—
comparisons absent in previous studies (Saunders & Jess, 2010; Tousignant et al., 1986).
Second, we were also able to compare misinformation types when their rates were off floor
(cf. Nemeth & Belli, 2006). Finally, and most importantly, we controlled for item differences
that may have contributed to differences in previous work (e.g., Saunders & Jess, 2010) by
counterbalancing the specific items used to create additive and contradictory items. Thus, we
can have more confidence that differences in additive and contradictory misinformation rates
are due to qualitative aspects of how falsely suggested details impacted memory for the
original event and not due to the suggestibility of a particular item.
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Although younger and older adults were both less susceptible to contradictory versus
additive misinformation, older adults showed a greater reduction in suggestibility to
contradictory misinformation, a finding demonstrating greater accuracy for older adults on
an episodic memory task. We suggest that older adults may be spontaneously more vigilant
and likely to notice errors during the misleading question phase, possibly due to differences
in conscientiousness and therefore more likely to reject these errors on the final test. In
Experiment 2, we evaluated this possibility by comparing three separate types of warning
instructions: A general warning, a warning with instructions to report all detected errors, and
Detection + Examples instructions that provided specific examples of additive and
contradictory misinformation types. We expected that if older adults were spontaneously
more vigilant towards error detection, then additional instruction to explicitly detect errors
would procure no greater reduction in contradictory misinformation at test. Consistent with
our prediction, older adults showed no differences in contradictory misinformation rates
across increasing levels of warning and detection instructions, whereas younger adults
successfully reduced contradictory misinformation to the same level as older adults
following Detection + Examples instructions. Interestingly, additive misinformation was
immune to the increasing strength of warning, consistent with the notion that the
supplementary nature of additive misinformation is less likely to be detected and rejected at
test, even under conditions in which error detection is prioritized.
The use of three different types of warnings in Experiment 2 provides additional information
regarding the effectiveness of warnings in misinformation paradigms and how these
warnings differentially affect younger and older adults. To our knowledge, our study is the
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first to compare the effectiveness of increasing strengths of warnings in younger and older
adults, though comparisons were not made to a non-warning control. We therefore
conducted a series of cross-experimental comparisons between additive and contradictory
misinformation types between younger and older adults in Experiment 1 and the warning
groups in Experiment 2 to evaluate whether warning and detection instructions were
effective at reducing misinformation relative to a non-warning control. This analysis
revealed that, for younger adults, only the Detection + Examples group reduced
misinformation for contradictory items relative to all instructions, ts > 2.96, ds > 0.76, with
all other comparisons being non-significant, including those with additive items, ts < 1. For
older adults, there were no differences for either misinformation type across warning
instructions, ts < 1. Thus, even relative to a non-warning control, warning and detection
instructions appear to be largely ineffective at reducing misinformation effects, except for
younger adults in the Detection + Examples group for contradictory items.
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Regarding age-related differences in error detection, our results showed that the strong
Detection + Examples instructions did not reliably increase detection rates for older adults
but did lead to an increase in younger adults. As mentioned above, older adults’ similar error
detection rates in the Detection and Detection + Examples groups and subsequently low
suggestibility across all conditions indicate that the low contradictory misinformation rate
may be due to their spontaneous monitoring of errors during the misleading question and
final test phases. For younger adults, however, successful detection rates under Detection +
Examples instructions did increase, which led to a reduction in contradictory misinformation
on the final test. Of course, since participants only reported whether an error was present in a
specific sentence, it is unclear whether participants were successfully detecting the exact
errors or instead fail to remember the original story but do notice a difference in the
question. Determining the specific errors that participants detect by having them explicitly
report the exact errors they think they found (“it was X, not Y” instead of simply marking
“error”) in future work could provide additional evidence that participants are rejecting those
errors that are initially detected.
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Detection instructions in Experiment 2 further allowed for a comparison of the rates of
detected errors between misinformation types. Across both detection instructions, rates of
successful detection of additive and contradictory errors were higher than false alarms to
neutral items, though no differences between the two misinformation types were found. The
equivalence between misinformation types may appear surprising since 1) discrepancies are
more concrete with contradictory items and arguably easier to identify and 2) there is a
difference between the types for subsequent suggestibility. One possible reason for this
similarity is that as mentioned above, the detection instructions themselves did not require
that participants specify exact errors they thought were embedded within the questions. It is
therefore unclear as to whether participants detected the precise error successfully which is a
critical component of the Discrepancy Detection principle (Loftus, 2005; Tousignant et al.,
1986).
Another possibility is that the task of detecting additive versus contradictory details during
the misleading question phase is not all that different. That is, detection of a specific contrast
from the original story may not be necessary to detect an error. When a new detail is
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presented during the misleading question phase, this detail may be just as anomalous to
participants regardless of its relationship to details in the original event simply due to its
novelty. Thus, the detection of novelty from the suggested details themselves could be the
feature that participants are reporting when detecting an error, not because they are noticing
a discrepancy with the original event. The results may then suggest that only when the
differences are accessible during the final test does one see the effects on suggestibility. For
contradictory details, memory for the exposures to (if not the content of) both the original
and contradictory details are needed to inoculate against contradictory misinformation. For
additive details, however, these details have become familiar and fluent due to recent
exposure and come to mind more easily than the memory for a lack of an original detail.
Errors then become more likely, and additive misinformation is endorsed at a high rate.
Thus, for both types of misinformation, the detection process during the misleading question
phase may occur similarly (i.e., detection of novelty), but the rejection process on the final
test is more difficult for additive than contradictory details. Determining whether the
detection process that occurs during the misleading question phase is the same or different
processes that is occurring during the final test that is leading to the rejection is an important
step for future work.
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The misinformation rates found in our experiments are consistent with the notion that
misinformation responses reflect a source-monitoring error in which participants become
confused regarding the correct source of falsely suggested details (Lindsay & Johnson,
1989). Source confusions can account for both additive and contradictory misinformation
effects, though source confusions are less likely for contradictory items as the original event
sources are easier to recollect. In general, older adults are more likely to commit source
errors (Hashtroudi et al., 1989) and struggle with inhibiting irrelevant information (Hasher &
Zacks, 1988), which may account for the relative increase in misinformation effects
generally found in older adults (Wylie et al., 2014). In our experiments however, older adults
did not show an increased misinformation effect for either item type. We note that this
pattern is not unheard of (e.g., Holliday et al., 2011; Marche et al., 2002) and may reflect an
age-related propensity to spontaneously monitor for suggested errors (Schwartz, 2002). This
age difference does not appear to be consistent with the either the source-monitoring or
inhibitory deficit accounts. Given that older adults show a reduction in contradictory
misinformation, our data suggest that older adults may be better at monitoring for and then
rejecting more recently encountered information that is false.
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Our experiments also employed an entirely fictional story and primarily used proper nouns
as the vehicle for misinformation. The purpose of these materials was simply to equate (by
removal) possible age differences in prior knowledge as older adults tend to have more prior
knowledge (Park, 2000) and rely on it more than younger adults (Umanath & Marsh, 2014).
In applied scenarios, such as eyewitness events, witnesses are likely accompanied by a
degree of prior knowledge which can impact information that is attended to and retrieved. In
our paradigm, age differences in schematic information (i.e., knowledge of car accidents or
crimes) or other types of knowledge (i.e., facts or vocabulary) could not have affected
misinformation responses since suggested items were novel fake facts. Indeed, by
eliminating the possibility for use of schematic knowledge, older adults may have been
disproportionately encouraged to be more vigilant regarding the accuracy of information to
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which they were exposed. Systematically examining the accessibility and use of prior
knowledge to assist in monitoring for memory accuracy could be fruitful area of research
when evaluating age-related differences.
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The use of a fictional story may have also led to differences in how participants evaluated
information within the story due to how individuals tend to “suspend their disbelief” when
reading fictional narrative information. Suspension of disbelief refers to how individuals
reduce their monitoring for accuracy in order to transport themselves into a narrative (Green,
Garst, & Brock, 2004). In doing so, participants may actually become more susceptible to
suggestibility (versus a nonfictional narrative) since accuracy of information is deemphasized in favor of immersion in the narrative world. To our knowledge, there has been
no study that has evaluated the extent to which younger and older adults suspend (or are able
to suspend) their disbelief in such contexts, thus it is unclear to what extent suspension of
disbelief may have influenced age-related differences in suggestibility.
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Finally, while our paradigm was not designed to mimic eyewitness scenarios in materials
(e.g., narrative versus crime scene), it does share many of the same elements. First,
misinformation tends to be stronger for peripheral details relative to focal plot points (e.g.,
Heath & Erickson, 1998; Loftus, 1979), such as our use of names and proper nouns that
were not needed to comprehend the narrative. Second, misinformation regarding proper
nouns is a likely source in eyewitness scenarios given that names and locations often
accompany these events. Names and locations that are supplementary are particularly
harmful to memory in younger and older adults, and in spite of the fact that older adults
show impairments in name recognition (Barresi, Obler, & Goodglass, 1998), they were not
more suggestible to these details. Third, a fictional story mimics narrative information in
eyewitness events and fits with other laboratory-based paradigms that have shown
misinformation effects using a variety of materials (e.g., slide sequences, videos, etc., see
Zaragoza et al., 2007, for review). Finally, our use of a 3-AFC test is likely similar to many
of the direct questioning methods used on eyewitnesses. Although there are many benefits to
using free-recall type questioning in forensic settings such as the cognitive interview (Fisher
& Geiselman, 1992), we note that this type of questioning is not practiced universally (e.g.,
Brunel & Py, 2013; Wells, Memon, & Penrod, 2006) and may leave witnesses with tests/
questioning procedures that require discrimination of correct and incorrect information like
the 3-AFC. Thus, our paradigm shares many similarities with eyewitness events and
laboratory-based paradigms and even offers advantages of using names and locations as
misinformation which are often critical details.
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Conclusions
The present study was designed to evaluate misinformation effects in younger and older
adults for two fundamentally different types of suggested details—those that are
supplementary (i.e., additive) to the original event, and those that are contradictory. The
results of the study are noteworthy in that additive details were falsely recognized at a
greater rate than contradictory in both age groups. We argue that this difference represents a
detect-and-reject process that is more successful for contradictory items whereby
participants can detect a memory discrepancy between the original and suggested details at
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test and select the correct detail. In addition, it was found that, except for younger adult
strong warning instructions, contradictory misinformation was lower for older adults, which
may suggest an overall increased vigilance towards the detection of memory discrepancies
making older adults more successful rejecting errors at test. Consistent with this possibility,
only younger adults could reduce errors caused by contradictory misinformation under
conditions designed to encourage error detection. The present experiments therefore provide
evidence for the detect-and-reject process for contradictory items and show age-related
differences in how groups implement error detection processes—processes that provide
important information about how memory accuracy can be improved.
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More broadly, understanding how strongly and in what ways different types of
misinformation affect individuals, both young and old, is becoming more and more critical
as people are constantly inundated with information—much of which they may have little to
no prior related knowledge of. The finding that additive misinformation is not only more
potent than contradictory misinformation but also resistant to heightened monitoring is
disconcerting but critical to further understand. Determining whether or not susceptibility to
additive misinformation can be reduced will only come from investigating why people are
suggestible to it in the first place. Similarly, delving into the mechanisms that drive older
adults’ reduced suggestibility here to contradictory misinformation with and without any
warning or vigilance instructions may allow us to discover ways in which we may reduce
suggestibility for everyone. A hint of what might inoculate against suggestibility is seen in
the very strong detection instructions with examples condition wherein younger adults were
finally able to reduce their susceptibility to at least contradictory misinformation. Future
work should be aimed at a deeper understanding of these misinformation types, how
suggestibility can be reduced for each, and what we can learn from older adults’ reduced
suggestibility to benefit everyone.
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Appendix A “The Art Thief” Fictional Story Adapted from Marsh (2004) With
Misinformation Items in Parentheses
People are always asking you questions like “How are you?” or “Having a nice day?” for
which they don’t really want the real answers. Instead they want stock, short, acceptable
answers.

Author Manuscript

I’m sitting in this seedy little bar near (Bumbaru Palace/Simfara Palace), the palace in
Zambari where the Monarch of Konkali lives, and you’ve just asked me why I’ve chosen to
hang out in this particular bar. I can’t just answer “Because it’s close to my hostel” or
“because they have the best (Modicum/Venton) burgers, the kind made from aged deer
meat”, because neither is true and there’s a story to be told… I meet people wherever I go -at parties, on planes, in bookstores. I get some great stories that way. Not to brag, but I once
even met the cousin of the guy whose next door neighbor was friends with (Charles
Tomelroy/Charles Greene) the man who created the ‘Barney the Alley Cat’ comic strip.
And, believe it or not, I shared a beer with a great-great-great-grandson of (the DeWhits/
Keatings) the New England family who had the famous feud with the VanPattersons.

Author Manuscript

But nothing compares to the story I’m about to tell you -- it’s about a guy I met last year
when I was here in Zambari for spring break, after a stop-over at (the Widow’s Cliff/Tavern
of Eternity), the famous prehistoric structure on the Devil’s Coast. So I wandered into this
little hole-in-the-wall kind of bar, because I was lost, and I wanted someplace to read my
guidebook away from the pickpockets. I sat down next to this kinda scruffy looking guy who
had obviously had way too much to drink, and he just started talking!
“Ah, my friend, the city! The lights! The people! My American friend, can you believe we
are in Zambari? I just came from a fairly impressive city, (Alondaro/Constanago) the capital
of Twonkali -- but compared to this - nothing!”
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I glanced over at the guy, it was dark in the bar, like it is today. I couldn’t really see him, and
frankly, I wasn’t very interested in what he had to say. Why would I want to talk to an
American in Zambari? A drunk, old American who looked like he hadn’t showered in a few
days? Especially because he looked remarkably like (Rafiki/Taruba) the former dictator of
Adonia.
I was not in the mood. The guy caught my glance.
“So, little American, you think I am nothing but a silly, pathetic tourist? You look at me like
I’m (Kintu/Shama) a legendary two-headed horse from Indian mythology! No, you are the
tourist—you are a student, correct? Well, listen to me, and you can learn a thing or two.”

Author Manuscript

I glanced around the bar, thinking maybe I should switch to the only open seat I could see,
but just then, a lady entered the bar. My sense of (Cavaldry/Paprin) the ancient code of ethics
practiced by kings and emperors, wouldn’t let me expose a woman to this crazy old
American. I braced myself and felt like just by staying put, I was (Olloeus/Omicon) the man
in Eskimo mythology that rescues the magic harp from the sea dragon. Who knew what this
guy was going to say next? It wouldn’t have surprised me if he tried to tell me that he was
(Sir Vansplaken/Sir Amants) the leading general of the Resistance, come back to life.
“So, what do you do?” he asked me.
“Is your daddy paying for your trip? Do you ever make any money for yourself? Do you
ever live dangerously, or do you just go to all the tourist sites and check things off your
itinerary?”

Author Manuscript

He polished off another vodka shot and banged his glass down onto the bar. I decided that
maybe if I just ignored him he’d stop talking, and meanwhile I’d just look up things in my
guidebook while finishing my drink.
Earlier, I had noticed a page or two about how the Campaigns of (Frederick/Teutonic)
Expansion, wars waged by the German Colonials” had influenced life in Zambari and was
eager to find out more. This was when I realized I had accidentally swapped my guidebook
for a book by (J.R. Duke/J.R. McCormick) the author of “The Kavanaugh Adventures.”
Since I didn’t have my guidebook to hide behind, I resigned myself to listening to what the
old American had to say.

Author Manuscript

“Me, I am an art connoisseur. I am like the Angelican warrior who met his death because of
his vulnerable arm; art is my arm. I do whatever it takes to get myself pretty, interesting
paintings. Once I even ended up with (amilinosis/syndaria) the sailor’s disease that results
from a deficiency in beta carotene, in pursuit of a painting—don’t ask me how. Once I get
them, I appreciate them fully, unlike all those silly people who go to the museums just
because they feel like they should. And, you know, I want to be the first at something like
(John Anderson/John Reynolds) the first person to set foot in Tanzania. Or, do something
really special like (Alfred Yates/Alfred Roberts) the person who proposed the Theory of
Maladaptability. Well, except I intend to be infamous instead…
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You have heard of the disappearance of the original clothes pin (Matthew Delbason/Matthew
Vankirk) that was invented? A little outside of my traditional art taste but it looks so nice by
my fireplace, really gives the room that vintage look… you look uneasy, my friend. Don’t
worry. I am not a thief. I am not about to pick your pocket. What, you compare me to a
swindler who convinces an old man that he’s selling him (Oswald/Victor) King Gregory’s
shield?”
Definitely crazy, I decided. Just my luck, to meet a crazy American in Zambari.
“But what is the most beautiful painting of them all? (Andrew Carlton’s/Andrew Moore’s)
Monticello: Home of Jefferson, of course, and that is why I must have it for my home.”
He laughed at my look of disbelief.

Author Manuscript

“You don’t believe me? But you see, it was surprisingly simple. There are natural tunnels
under the museum. I just dug into one of them from the basement of a nearby building. The
hard part, my friend, was getting the painting off the wall. What made it all possible, though,
was that no one believed that anyone would ever try to steal the Monticello—and when
people assume something is impossible, they are bound to overlook something. It’s the same
basic principle that got (Florence/Gwendolyn) the nymph who got caught in a golden net by
a young woodsman—she thought she would never be caught!”
The drunkard paused and considered me.
“You want to make some real money? By yourself?”
He leaned closer and whispered into my ear. His breath was foul.

Author Manuscript

“See what I will give you if you help me…” with that, he reached into his pocket and
produced a blue stone, which glistened even in the dim light of the bar. It was as big as a
(Gesmetite/Sinaium) the legendary jewel from which people can see their future.
“It’s a sapphire.”
I think he misinterpreted my silence as some kind of agreement or interest. He grinned like
(a flamingo/cockatoo) the bird that spoke to Amelia in “Over the Rainbow.”

Author Manuscript

“Here’s what I need you to do. Go to the airport and use my plane ticket to fly back home.
That’s all. I just need it to look as if I left Zambari. Then, if anyone should even think to
track me, the last place they will look for me is here. Or maybe I will travel around the
Continent. There is so much beautiful art on the Continent to see… I would like to see the
Inn with the famous Impressionist artwork of San Pedro.”
He ended his reverie and looked sharply at me.
“What say you? You want the sapphire?”
By this point in time, I had finished my drink, settled my check, and figured out where I was
headed next. I had decided to go see an exhibit on (Robelor/Froka), the Dutch god of blood
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and carnal sin. There was also an exhibit on (a black wolf/speckled coyote) the canine that
ancient Mayans held sacred, that looked interesting. I had no more reasons to sit and listen
to a crazy guy.
So I stood up, made sure I had all my things, and started towards the door. But for a drunk,
the old guy moved quickly—before I was two steps away, he had an incredibly firm grip on
my upper right arm.
“You arrogant little American” he hissed.
“You don’t believe a word I’ve said. You probably think I’m a crazy person carting around a
blue paperweight. I was being nice—offering you a chance for a little excitement, and you
walk out on me.”
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His grip on my arm tightened, it was actually painful. It felt like (centrifugal syringe/platelet
filter) the instrument which stops the flow of plasma in the blood during operations.
“Before you go, my friend, I ask you to look in this shopping bag, but don’t say a word!
Don’t be like (Jacob Blackburn/Thomas Landon) the infamous Australian traitor in the 12years war! Don’t make me yell ‘Why me, my friend?’ like (Prince Michael/Lady Marie!)”
Reminiscent of (Behemad/Raheb) the magician from King Tut’s era, he produced a dirty
shopping bag out of nowhere.

Author Manuscript

I shook his grip off, and just so he’d leave me alone, I looked in the shopping bag. What I
saw was a wrench. As bizarre as that was, I was thankful that it was just a regular kind of
wrench, not something crazy like a (diploid/tapper) a mallet fastened to the end of a wrench
so it can be used as a hammer. After I stared at that for thirty seconds, I realized he actually
wanted me to look at something else—a rolled up piece of parchment. All I could see was
that it was an oil painting, with greeny-gold at the edges. But surely it couldn’t be…
I don’t know how long I just stood there with the open shopping bag in my hands. Suddenly
the air was pierced with the sound of sirens, the old man brusquely grabbed the shopping
bag away from me, and I was alone. The next day I eagerly bought a newspaper—no art
theft. Nor the next day, nor the day after that. Like (a withholder/noncontributory) someone
who does not participate in government but does not protest its establishment, I was feeling
skeptical. I didn’t want to unnecessarily panic art lovers over something that wasn’t true, the
way a rash of suicides followed the publication of the book “Plague of Fears.”
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I had classified it all in mind as a hoax on the old man’s part until I got home. Waiting on
my doorstep was a box addressed to me, and it contained the paperweight with a note
attached:
“I forgive you, my friend, for your lack of imagination. Thanks for listening to an old man.
Now do something exciting with this cat’s eye. I’ve given you the real thing. Guess what my
next adventure is going to be? I’m off to find (Tomad/Waterston) the legendary city that
floated off into space.”
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I don’t know how the old man got my address or even my name. I don’t know what to think
about the Mona Lisa currently sitting in the Louvre. All I know for sure is that he sent me a
sapphire that I sold for $50,000 -- enough to pay off the rest of my college tuition, but
instead I used it to take a trip around the world. I saw it as an opportunity to be (a silvery
lynx/oriental tiger) the cat that sprang to life from its own grave and resurrect my former
self. I’m doing something exciting like the old guy said—and that’s how I’ve come to be
here in this bar talking to you. Revisiting the scene of the crime, so to speak.
Next stop, I think I’ll take a little trip to (Tapie/Contu) the top of the largest plateau in
Namibia.

Appendix B. Misinformation Conditionalized on Successful Detection
Author Manuscript
Author Manuscript

Since the both detection groups noted which items they thought contained errors during the
misleading question phase, we can examine whether errors that were successfully (vs.
unsuccessfully) detected were subsequently rejected on a final test. We therefore
conditionalized misinformation selection on the final test based on successful or
unsuccessful detection during the cued-recall phase for each of the misinformation types as a
function of age and detection instructions (Table B1). A 2 (Item Type: Additive vs.
Contradictory) × 2 (Detection Type: Successful vs. Unsuccessful) × 2 (Detection
Instructions: Detection vs. Detection + Examples) × 2 (Age: Younger vs. Older) mixed
ANOVA was used to evaluate these effects. A main effect of Item Type was found, F(1, 101)
= 118.15, MSE = .07, ηp2 = .54, revealing that misinformation rates were greater for additive
than contradictory items (.57 vs. .29) consistent with non-conditionalized misinformation
rates. Effects of Detection Type, Detection Instructions, and Age were all nonsignificant, Fs
< 3.01, ps > .09, as were all interactions except for the 4-way interaction which reached
conventional significance, F(1, 101) = 4.00, MSE = .05, ηp2 = .04.
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To follow-up on the 4-way interaction, separate 3-way analyses were conducted by
conducting separate analyses on additive and contradictory misinformation types. Beginning
with additive misinformation, effects of Detection Type, Instructions, and Age failed to
reach significance as did all interactions, Fs < 2.84, ps > .10, except for the marginal threeway interaction, F(1, 105) = 3.39, MSE = .06, p = .07, ηp2 = .03. This interaction reflected
nonsignificant numeric reduction in additive misinformation for younger adults in the
Detection + Examples group when items were successfully detected versus unsuccessfully
detected (.53 vs. .63), t(27) = 1.80, SEM = .06, p = .08, d = 0.36, with all other comparisons
non-significant, ts < 1. Therefore, except for this marginal pattern, the effects of additive
misinformation appear to be relatively immune to whether these details were detected
initially across age groups and detection instructions.
Turning to contradictory misinformation, nonsignificant tends were found for Detection
Type, F(1, 110) = 2.94, MSE = .04, p = .09, ηp2 = .03, and Detection Instructions, F(1, 110)
= 4.72, MSE = .08, p = .06, ηp2 = .04, but a significant effect of Age was found, F(1, 110) =
8.87, MSE = .07, ηp2 = .08. The effects of Age and Detection Instructions were qualified by
a significant interaction, F(1, 110) = 4.72, MSE = .08, ηp2 = .04. In parallel to the nonconditionalized analyses above, follow-up tests revealed that contradictory misinformation
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was significantly reduced for younger adults in the Detection + Examples group relative to
the Detection group (.28 vs. .42), t(55) = 2.50, SEM = .06, d = 0.67, whereas for older
adults, their lower misinformation selection was equivalent between both detection groups (.
25 vs. .23), t < 1. All other interactions, including the three-way interaction were not
significant, Fs < 1.
The conditionalized analyses therefore reveal that, consistent with a detect-and-reject
process, contradictory, but not additive misinformation that was successfully detected during
the misleading question phase was less likely to be falsely remembered on the final 3-AFC
test for both younger and older adults and in both detection groups. Thus, both age groups
derive similar benefits from both detection instructions.
Table B1
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Mean Proportions (SD) of Misinformation Falsely Recognized on the Final 3-Alternative
Forced-Choice Recognition Test Conditionalized Based on Error Detection During the
Misleading Question Phase in Experiment 2.
Item Type/Group

Additive

Contradictory

Successful Detection

Unsuccessful Detection

Successful Detection

Unsuccessful Detection

Younger Adults

.63 (.36)

.57 (.23)

.39 (.36)

.44 (.23)

Older Adults

.53 (.30)

.58 (.23)

.22 (.26)

.25 (.17)

Younger Adults

.53 (.30)

.63 (.25)

.25 (.26)

.31 (.20)

Older Adults

.50 (.32)

.48 (.20)

.24 (.23)

.28 (.21)

Detect Group

Detect + Group
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Public Significance Statement
The present experiments demonstrate that exposure to false additive supplementary
details increases misinformation memory errors for these details relative to false
contradictory details that contrast specific details from an original event. This pattern is
found in both younger and older adults, however older adults were less susceptible to
contradictory misinformation errors than younger adults, demonstrating that under some
circumstances, older adults are less likely to produce memory errors.
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Table 1
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Sample Additive, Contradictory, and Neutral Item Types Across Study, Misleading Question, and Final 3Alternative-Forced-Choice (3-AFC) Test Phases in Experiments 1 and 2.
Phase/Item Type

Study Phase

Misleading Cued-Recall Question

Final 3-AFC Test Options

Additive

“Especially because he looked
remarkably like the former
dictator of Adonia.”

“What kind of ruler was Rafiki, the former dictator of
Adonia?”

“Taruba”
“Rafiki”
“I don’t know/Neither”

Contradictory

“Especially because he looked
remarkably like Taruba the
former dictator of Adonia.”

“What kind of ruler was Rafiki, the former dictator of
Adonia?”

“Taruba”
“Rafiki”
“I don’t know/Neither”

Neutral

“Especially because he looked
remarkably like the former
dictator of Adonia.”

“What kind of ruler was the former dictator of
Adonia?”

“Taruba”
“Rafiki”
“I don’t know/Neither”

Note. Test question for final 3-AFC test was “Especially because he looked remarkably like _______ the former dictator of Adonia.”
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Table 2
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Mean (SD) Proportions of Correct Cued-Recall and Correctly Selected Alternatives and Falsely Selected
Additive and Contradictory Misinformation for Younger and Older Adults in the 3-AFC Test in Experiment 1.
Age Group/Test
N
Correct Cued-Recall

Younger Adults

Older Adults

32

29

.41 (.17)

.30 (.12)

3-AFC Test
Correctly Selected Alternatives
Comprehension

.93 (.06)

.90 (.09)

Additive

.26 (.25)

.21 (.25)

Contradictory

.44 (.25)

.59 (.15)

Neutral

.43 (.29)

.42 (.35)

Falsely Selected Misinformation

Author Manuscript

Additive

.52 (.21)

.57 (.25)

Contradictory

.40 (.22)

.28 (.14)
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---

Contradictory

Neutral

.08 (.10)

.26 (.20)

.18 (.16)

38 (.16)

31

Detection Group

.11 (.11)

.44 (.22)

.47 (.26)

.43 (.20)

30

Detection + Examples Group

--

--

--

.26 (.14)

28

Warn Group

.12 (.11)

.33 (.20)

.36 (.19)

.35 (.19)

29

Detection Group

.15 (.16)

.43 (.22)

.42 (.24)

.31 (.14)

30

Detection + Examples Group

Older Adults

Note. Proportions of errors detected for neutral items are false alarms since no misinformation was presented in these question types.

--

Additive

.39 (.17)

31

Warn Group

Misinformation Detected

Correct Cued-Recall

N

Group/Variable

Younger Adults

Mean (SD) Proportions of Correct Cued-Recall and Misinformation Detected as a Function of Warning Group for Younger and Older Adults in
Experiment 2.
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Warn Group

.34 (.33)

.47 (.26)
.47 (.27)

Contradictory

Neutral

.55 (.23)
.40 (.22)

Additive

Contradictory

Falsely Selected Misinformation

.47 (.21)

.23 (.20)

Additive

.41 (.22)

.58 (.19)

.20 (.21)

.91 (.09)

.94 (.06)

Detection Group

Comprehension

Correctly Selected Alternatives

Group/Variable

.26 (.15)

.56 (.21)

.62 (.17)

.62 (.18)

.30 (.25)

.89 (.09)

Detection + Examples Group

Younger Adults

.26 (.14)

.54 (.22)

.46 (.33)

.61 (.16)

.28 (.22)

.89 (.09)

Warn Group

.24 (.15)

.55 (.20)

.53 (.30)

.59 (.22)

.30 (.23)

.87 (.10)

Detection Group

.26 (.15)

.50 (.17)

.56 (.30)

.61 (.16)

.34 (.21)

.87 (.11)

Detection + Examples Group

Older Adults

Mean Proportions (SD) of Misleading Questions Correctly Detected in the Misleading Question Phase, Comprehension Questions Correctly Recognized,
and Additive and Contradictory Misinformation Questions Falsely Recognized in the Final 3-AFC Test in Experiment 2.
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